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The purpose of this research is to examine the following research question: how has 
enforcement of Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) adapted to the Big Box 
business system innovation? Additionally, the study explored the possible nature of regulatory 
choke points that may emerge from the enforcement of RCRA in the Big Box retail system. This 
study used contingency theory to establish a foundation for analysis of the Big Box business 
system innovation through identification of structural elements, external influences, and their 
subsequent interactions associated with the Big Box retail system in terms of environmental 
compliance with the RCRA enforced by the United States (US) Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA). This research employed an embedded comparative case study design using the 
comparison of two Big Box firms, Walmart Stores, Inc. and Target Corporation, nationally and 
for the following states with opposing enforcement strategies: Arizona, Kentucky, Missouri, and 
Texas. The data used was obtained from third-party federal or firm-maintained sources.  
Findings indicate Walmart adheres to the structural models developed using contingency 
theory principles and incurs more impacts from regulatory agencies due to the enforcement of 
RCRA. Furthermore, it was observed that inspections of the firms are not distributed throughout 
the organizational structural elements by all states. Additionally, the use of different enforcement 
strategies resulted in the emergence of regulatory choke points by Arizona, Kentucky, and 
Texas; however, Missouri appears to balance enforcement without causing a regulatory choke 
point.  
This research has identified that the enforcement of RCRA has not universally adapted 
to the demands of the Big Box business system innovation. Agency implications, firm 
implications, directions for further research, and continued development of a regulatory choke 





CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This research explores the enforcement strategies of states as they adapt an 
environmental regulation for hazardous materials to the emergence of “Big Box” retail systems. 
This topic provides a way of exploring two important questions.  First, how are states adapting a 
regulation designed for large scale industrial systems to one of the defining large scale business 
innovations of the modern era, i.e. the Big Box retail industry? Second, what challenges do the 
variety of state enforcement patterns pose to Big Box firms for compliance strategies?  
The emergence of the Big Box business system innovation in the late-1970s is a 
business and organizational innovation that has drastically changed the nature of retail 
commerce domestically through the creation of a new business system innovation intricately 
driven by market forces. Big Box, also known as hypermarkets or category killer stores, are 
designed to provide a one-stop shopping experience where consumers can purchase a wide 
variety of products, such as, but not limited to, household goods and small appliances, clothing, 
jewelry, electronics, toys, groceries, and pharmaceuticals. The Big Box business system 
innovation developed in response to economic market pressures from a burgeoning US 
economy for products provided at discount prices and in larger quantities. (Hutter & Jones, 
2007) 
 Few people would debate the Big Box business system innovation has established itself  
as an iconic industrial development in the United States and across the globe through the 
intense physical presence of stores and as well as technological innovations, such as internet 
shopping, product differentiation, and media. Big Box chains, such as Walmart and Target, are 
often synonymous with suburbia and are a staple in many people’s retail experiences. The Big 
Box business system innovation is founded on the ability to use technological innovations 
facilitating the perpetual increase in the size of structural elements comprising the organizational 




system innovation are: 1) number of facility locations; 2) facility sizes ranging between 90,000 to 
200,000+ square feet; 3) extensive variety of products; and 4) classification as a national chain 
due to operating in more than 10 states (Kane, 1993).  
Most research conducted on the Big Box business system innovation has revolved 
around economic development concerns, market impacts, and employment impacts. (Boarnet & 
Crane, 1999; Chen, 2003; Clanton, 1993; Goetz & Swaminathan, 2006; Jones & Doucet, 2000; 
Mitchell, 2007; Salkin, 2004) However, in comparison, the research on environmental regulation 
and compliance has been strangely quiet on the environmental impacts associated with Big Box 
retail industry operations. In practice, the Big Box retail industry has to ensure environmental 
compliance ranging from a diversity of environmental impacts associated with, but not limited to, 
wastewater, stormwater, hazardous waste, universal waste, spills, air, municipal waste, and 
aboveground/underground tanks. This research will utilize the Big Box retail industry’s 
implementation of hazardous wastes and universal wastes regulations, which are regulated 
through the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), to look at one of the areas of 
environmental impacts associated with this new business system innovation.  Big Box stores 
are so large that normal stockpiles of products can trigger standards of enforcement for 
accumulations of hazardous waste.  
 Ensuring compliance across the magnitude of facility locations associated with the Big 
Box business system innovation could result in stresses to the regulatory enforcement 
capabilities of federal, state, county, and municipal regulatory groups. It is anticipated that 
stresses applied to the regulatory enforcement system would result in the use of adaptation 
strategies by regulatory groups that may include modification of enforcement strategies. 
Variation in enforcement strategies at the state level; between states and US Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA); and between EPA regions has been identified in a study performed 




 Different patterns of enforcement have the potential to cause stresses for the firm in 
complying with the enforcement of RCRA.  From a firm perspective, different enforcement 
strategies create a lack of feasible alternatives from outside of the organizational system and 
reduced support capabilities from within the organizational system, known as regulatory choke 
points. The focus of this study is to explore the reciprocal relationship between state patterns of 
enforcement and managerial challenges that such patterns pose for Big Box firms in developing 
compliance strategies. Challenges include the large number of inspections and enforcement 
events nationally, adapting to the variance in enforcement patterns, and effectively targeting 
compliance resources.  Of particular interest is understanding the nature and level of threat that 
may cause a firm to experience regulatory choke points in compliance resulting from aggregate 
enforcement patterns. Therefore, it is important to understand the enforcement strategies used 
by regulatory groups to address the emergence of business system innovations, such as the Big 
Box business system innovation, because it could result in stresses to the business innovation, 
the regulatory group, and the regulation itself. 
This research will employ an embedded comparative case study design where the 
primary unit of analysis is the firm.  A comparison is made of two Big Box retail firms which differ 
in the size and scope of their operations. The embedded case studies examine the experiences 
of these firms in the patterns of enforcement across states.  The embedded cases are of states 
classified as high enforcement states or low enforcement states, both considered deterrent 
regulatory strategies, based on the number of inspections performed over a five year period. 
(Potoski, 2004) This research will utilize different state patterns of enforcement, low and high, as 
a basis for within case and between case variance across the states and between the firms.   
The rest of this study is organized as follows. In the remaining portion of Section 1, a 
high-level overview is provided on the selection of RCRA; the Big Box business system 
innovation; the use of Contingency Theory; enforcement strategies; and regulatory choke 




Theory to the Big Box business system innovation and regulatory enforcement, respectively. 
Sections 4 and 5 provide the hypothesis tested and the methods utilized for the research. 
Sections 6 and 7 provide histories of the Big Box business system innovation and RCRA, 
respectively. Section 8 consists of the case studies of Walmart, Target, and a cross-case 
comparison. Section 9 concludes with a discussion of policy implications. 
This study will provide a foundation for the application of contingency theory in 
understanding environmental impacts through interactions of regulatory groups with 
organizations. Additionally, this study will establish the Big Box retail industry as a dynamic 
industry suitable for future research. 
1.1 Why RCRA? 
In the 1970s, the first wave of the environmental regulatory movement resulted in 
environmental laws, such as, but not limited to, RCRA. RCRA, Public Law (P.L.) 94-580, 
primarily addresses the identification, classification, management, recovery, and disposal of 
hazardous waste materials and universal waste materials. (The Library of Congress, 1976) 
RCRA established a scale for the generation of hazardous waste materials and universal waste 
materials to identify different levels of threat to the environment and health of US citizens based 
upon total monthly and yearly quantities. Through reporting mechanisms, RCRA identifies 
industries accumulating hazardous waste materials and universal waste materials in large 
quantities. 
 RCRA is administered by EPA while being managed and implemented by state and 
territory governments. Currently, 50 states and territories have received state authorization for 
the implementation of RCRA. (US Environmental Protection Agency, 2010c) The statutory basis 
and intention behind RCRA is extensive and far reaching. The broad spectrum nature of RCRA 
results in a comprehensive regulation encompassing a wide variety of organizations and 
industries, which creates the opportunity for focused enforcement strategies to be used by 




hazardous waste activities facilitating monitoring activities for new business system innovations. 
In conjunction, RCRA, also, requires organizational submissions of yearly hazardous waste 
reports facilitating monitoring of existing regulated facilities. Due to the extensive nature of the 
RCRA regulations and the prevalence of implementation on a national-scale, this research will 
utilize RCRA as the environmental policy for analysis and environmental regulatory agencies as 
the external influences regulatory group for analysis.  
1.2 Why the Big Box business system innovation? 
An outcome of the increased facility size and extensive variety of products associated 
with the Big Box business system innovation resulted in triggering the enforcement of RCRA 
due to increasing the quantity of hazardous waste materials and universal waste materials 
generated through business operations. The structural elements of the Big Box business system 
innovation results in profound environmental implications due to the multitude of media 
regulated as a result of daily business operations. Two unique characteristics of the Big Box 
business system innovation are multi-state operations and number of Big Box facility locations. 
For example, Walmart Stores, Inc. operates approximately 4,200 facilities across the 50 US 
states and 6 US territories (Wal-mart Stores Inc., 2010a). The number and diversity of locations 
of the Big Box business system innovation requires the industry to be in compliance with US 
environmental regulations ranging across federal, state, county and municipal levels of 
government, such as RCRA. Due to the multitude of media, extensive facility locations, and 
RCRA applicability, the Big Box business system innovation will be used as the business 
system innovation for analysis. 
1.3 Contingency Theory, Big Box, and RCRA 
The focus of this study is to apply contingency theory to the Big Box business innovation 
to establish a foundation for analysis of the business system innovation in terms of 
environmental compliance with RCRA enforced by EPA. Many different theories are used in 




based theories, rational crime theory, cost-benefit analysis, regulatory federalism model, and 
the prisoner’s dilemma, to name a few. (Atlas, 2007; Helland, 1998; Heyes, 2000; Potoski, 
2004; Schauer & Zeckhauser, 2007) Contingency theory is appropriate for this study, because it 
is designed to understand the interaction between external influences and patterns of behavior; 
and organizational structures. According to Earnhart (2009), EPA has been investigating 
whether facility characteristics, such as size or permit conditions, are directly related to the 
effectiveness of regulatory enforcement. Furthermore, this research contributes to the regulation 
literature by addressing industry-specific factors and assessment of the influence of structural 
elements on a firm’s compliance with regulations, as suggested by Heyes (2000). 
Structural contingency theory facilitates the identification of the structural elements, 
external influences, and their subsequent interactions associated with the Big Box business 
system innovation. (Scott, 2003; Thompson, 1967) Contingency theory provides the foundation 
for looking at an organization as an “open system” interacting with its external influences1 
through its structural elements, which require continual change and adaptation mechanisms for 
continued firm survival. The Big Box business system innovation is a complex organizational 
structure operating as an “open system” experiencing demands and constraints between the 
varieties of external environments and the internal structure of the organization. From a 
contingency theory perspective, the Big Box business system innovation is a distributive system 
due to the “open systems” nature of the interactions between structural elements and external 
influences over the extensive number of facility locations comprising the firm. (Daft, 1995; Daft & 
Weick, 1984; Hall & Tolbert, 2005; Hutter & Jones, 2007) 
Fluctuations in external influences can result in business operational constraints and 
lead to negative direct economic impacts for the organization resulting in additional costs, loss 
                                               
1
 Contingency theory typically uses the term “environmental elements” due to the influences occurring from the 
external environment instead of the internal organizational environment. This study will use the term “external 
influences” to ensure the context of the word “environmental” is not misunderstood. The word “environmental” in 




of profits, and/or product obsolescence. (Hall & Tolbert, 2005) Additionally, external influences 
are hard to negotiate and anticipate from an organizational perspective; however, 
conceptualizing external influences in terms of business sectors provides a manageable 
approach for firms. Contingency theory facilitated the identification of the external influences 
interacting with the Big Box business system innovation. The external influences discussed in 
this research are: regulatory groups and economic markets. The external influence sector 
driving the creation of the Big Box business system innovation is unequivocally economic 
market pressures domestically and globally. However, required interactions with the regulatory 
environment put compliance pressures not only on organizational business managers, but on 
the regulatory enforcement group. This study will focus on the regulatory group external 
influence and its interaction with the Big Box business system innovation. (Daft, 1995; Daft & 
Weick, 1984; Thompson, 1967) 
Acknowledging the complex, variable, “open systems” organization structure of the Big 
Box business system innovation, contingency theory argues that the Big Box business system 
innovation would attempt to rationalize those aspects of the external environment that are 
influenced by regulations stemming from environmental policies (Simon, 1999).  
1.4 Enforcement Strategies and Regulatory Choke Points 
An organization’s ability to respond and its level of flexibility in addressing regulatory 
enforcement is constrained by the number of inspections performed and whether the regulatory 
group is using distributive enforcement or focused enforcement. The overall number of 
inspections performed allows a state to be classified as a low enforcement and a high 
enforcement state. Both of these enforcement strategies are a deterrent enforcement strategy 
approach founded in command-and-control regulation, such as RCRA. (Potoski, 2004) In 
addition to a classification based upon number of inspections, states will employ different 
strategies for the selection of facilities to inspect. (Earnhart, 2009; Telle, 2009) From the firm 




distributed across the different elements of an organizational system. In contrast, focused 
enforcement is the repeated occurrence of regulatory enforcement events at particular facility 
locations. Firm adaptation strategies vary based upon the type of enforcement used. (Wu, 2009) 
If a firm experiences distributive enforcement, the use of Standard Operating Procedures 
(SOPs) to standardize, formalize, and centralize the process associated with the regulation in 
question is typically sufficient. In contrast, focused enforcement requires in-depth training and 
assignment of personnel to address the higher incidence of regulatory attention. Regulatory 
enforcement and firm adaptation costs would have to be high for market-driven firms, such as 
the Big Box business system innovation, to change the structural elements of an organizational 
system. (Wu, 2009) 
The types of enforcement strategies listed above in their most pathological form can 
result in the emergence of a regulatory choke point. A regulatory choke point can occur when an 
organization experiences the imposition of a large number of contingencies on their 
organizational structure from external influences and/or a high-level of congestion from within 
the organizational system due to adaptation to external influences. The regulatory choke point 
theory is intended to identify enforcement events performed in high levels of frequency or 
magnitude. This theory is not intended to provide firms with the ability to claim all regulatory 
enforcement events result in the emergence of a choke point, as this statement is against the 
basis of the theory. 
A chronic choke point occurs when a regulatory group uses distributive enforcement, but 
the magnitude of inspected facilities across the entire organizational system is large. A chronic 
choke point results in congestion of the business system. In comparison, an acute choke point 
occurs when a regulatory group uses focused enforcement through repeated inspections at 
specific facilities. This high incidence of regulatory enforcement can result in a risk to the 
business system. Firms have accepted environmental enforcement as an expected cost of 




enforcement through damage mitigation, such as, but not limited to, loopholes and/or litigation 
(Kane, 1993; Wu, 2009).  
1.5 Significance of Research 
This study is unique for a variety of reasons. First, there has been no research 
conducted pertaining to the environmental impacts associated with the enforcement and 
compliance of the Big Box business system innovation. Second, the application of contingency 
theory to a business system innovation to provide the foundation for understanding 
environmental impacts through interactions of the regulatory group and the core structural 
elements has not been conducted. Third, the use of compliance data maintained by the EPA 
Enforcement and Compliance History Online (ECHO) system (US Environmental Protection 
Agency, 2010a) has not been utilized to assess regulatory enforcement strategies used by 
different states on a particular business system innovation. Therefore, the beneficial application 
of this research goes beyond understanding adaptation strategies and possible nature of 
regulatory choke points to include the application of contingency theory in an innovative way 






CHAPTER 2: STRUCTURAL CONTINGENCY THEORY 
 
 
2.1 Understanding the Elements of an Organization 
Contingency theory arose out of the “open systems” organizational research focusing on 
ways the organization avoids uncertainty from internal and external sources. Thompson (1967) 
proposed all organizations are open to external influences requiring adaptation through 
development or implementation of appropriate response components with varying levels of 
external influence exposure within the existing organizational system. Earnhart (2009) stated 
the lack of research in the regulatory compliance literature regarding the connections between 
facility-related influences and regulatory enforcement may have resulted in erroneous 
conclusions. To address this criticism, this study uses Thompson’s approach because it 
facilitates the identification of external influence interaction within an organizational structure 
through assessment of, but not limited to, the level of interdependence among organizational 
components and stability and/or homogeneity of the external influences. (Hutter & Jones, 2007; 
Scott, 2003) 
The interaction with external influences occurs within or through the three components of 
the organizational system: 1) inputs, 2) technological activities, and 3) outputs. Inputs can range 
from raw materials to products to personnel to information. The technological core is where the 
inputs are modified for export back into the external environment. Outputs are comprised of the 
end-products of the system and can include items such as, but not limited to, end-products to 
customer satisfaction to environmental pollution to by-products. (Daft, 1995) The “open system” 
organization is comprised of the three internal interdependent components (inputs, 
technological activities, and outputs) operating as an organization ultimately interdependent 
upon the external influences. However, an organization’s operation requires it to understand all 
aspects of its business system in terms of rational measures. This conversion of abstract factors 




1967) In conjunction with organizational rationality from an “open systems” approach, the 
overriding goal of organizations is to survive, instead of goal accomplishment, through the 
uncertainty emerging into the organizational system from internal and external sources.  
Organizations approaching organizational rationality with an open-system logic 
acknowledging the complexity, variability, and unpredictability of the complex factors of core 
technologies have an increased operational fluidity and responsiveness to changes to the 
system as a result of external influences. (Thompson, 1967) To reduce uncertainty through 
organizational viability and operationality, the organizational rationality components and external 
influences must be cohesive and have a level of connectedness.  
2.2 The Structural Elements and Big Box 
The deregulation of the retail industry through the Consumer Goods Pricing Act (CGPA) 
of 1975 led to the development and use of technological innovations in novel ways to 
accomplish aggregation of facility locations, facility sizes, and diverse products. In the case of 
the Big Box business system innovation, the organizational structure is primarily driven by 
economic market influences. (Hutter & Jones, 2007) Evolution of the US culture embracing 
suburban residential developments, suburban shopping malls, discount stores, and a 
developing interstate highway system set the foundation for the emergence of the Big Box 
business system innovation. (Spector, 2005) These market opportunities created the 
opportunity for the business system innovation that lead to the development of the 
organizational system associated with the Big Box retail industry. (Hutter & Jones, 2007) 
 In terms of contingency theory, the difference between standard retail establishments 
and the Big Box business system innovation is the number of components comprising the 
organizational structure in conjunction with the scaling of the inputs and outputs throughout the 
organizational system. Big Box’s core technology is based upon the distribution of mass 
quantities of products. In comparison, the standard retail system’s core technology is based 




with development and manufacturing. There are four structural elements of the Big Box 
business system innovation: 1) Distribution Centers; 2) Stores; 3) Return Centers; and 4) 
Corporate facilities. Corporate facilities are comprised of the administrative support facilities and 
ancillary divisions of the organization in place to provide supportive services to the core 
technology structural elements, Distribution Centers, Stores, and Return Centers, of the 
organizational system. 
 The basis of the Big Box business system innovation is founded on the structural “size” 
of the organization. As established in contingency theory, size is an important aspect of 
understanding the contextual nature of the structural elements of an organization, referred to as 
the domain effect in the regulatory literature. (Hutter & Jones, 2007) In comparison with the 
standard retail business system, the Big Box business system innovation has drastically 
modified many size-related structural elements of the overall system through the addition of the 
Logistics and Return Center divisions; increase of the diversity of products offered; increase the 
quantity of products offered; innovative nation-wide technological-based product distribution 
processes; innovative product scaling as a dimension of the organizational structure; developed 
nation-wide facility locations; and an increase in the nation-wide organizational visibility through 
media innovations. (Wu, 2009) 
Figure 1 depicts the structural elements of the standard retail system and Big Box retail 
system in terms of the structural elements described above. The complexity of the Big Box retail 
system’s organizational structure is influenced by the number of structural elements combined 
with the number of inputs, technological activities, and outputs associated with each structural 
element. Based upon the number of structural elements of the Big Box business system 









2.3 The External Influences and Big Box 
External influences are hard to negotiate and anticipate from an organizational 
perspective due to their unbounded nature. Bounding external influences in terms of business 
sectors provides a manageable approach for organizations. The sectors discussed in this 
research are: regulatory groups and economic markets. (Daft, 1995; Thompson, 1967) 
The Big Box retail industry has established a dominant foothold in the US and is 
increasingly using new technological innovations to adapt its organizational structural elements 
in response to economic market external influence. (Hutter & Jones, 2007) In addition to the 
economic market external influence, the Big Box business system innovation is influenced by 




groups do not drive the foundation of the organizational structural elements. As a secondary 
influence on the organizational system, environmental regulatory enforcement and compliance 
are necessary costs of daily business operations. Interdependency amongst the interactions 
between the structural element components and the external influences shows that external 
influences have the ability to impact the organization.  
Figure 2 depicts potential external influence interaction points of the standard retail 
system and Big Box retail system. The complexity of the Big Box retail system’s organizational 
structure depicts the strong occurrence of external influences on the Big Box business 
innovation system. Due to the number of inputs, technological activities, and outputs in the Big 
Box system compounded by the number of external influence interactions, the Big Box business 
system innovation has higher levels of complexity, variability, and unpredictability. (Daft, 1995; 





Figure 2. Retail systems with potential external influence interaction points 
 
 
External influences can become constraints, temporary or long-term, to the 
organizational system requiring the adaptation of the organization or develop into contingencies 
requiring the readjustment of the organizational system. (Thompson, 1967) Therefore, “either 
controlling or effectively predicting [external] influences shaping organizational output[s] is 
essential to the efficient accomplishment of organizational goals” (Simon, 1999). However, not 
all external influences affect organizations to the same degree. From the firm’s perspective, the 
different levels of affect and fluctuations associated with external influences result in business 
operational constraints and increased levels of organizational uncertainty. These fluctuations 
require the application of a variety of business adaptation techniques to address. Based upon 




higher risk for development of constraints and contingencies associated with external influences 
resulting in negative direct economic impacts. (Wu, 2009) 
From the regulatory group external influence perspective, business operational 
constraints and organizational uncertainty result in compliance variation within organizations 
and across industries. (Wu, 2009) To further complicate the influence of the environmental 
regulatory groups, the Big Box business system innovation strains the aggregation-based 
nature of RCRAs regulatory structure due to the sheer magnitude of facility locations. In terms 
of this research, both firms and regulatory groups are trying to adapt to external influence within 





CHAPTER 3: REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT 
 
 
3.1 Regulatory Enforcement 
The regulatory group is a highly variable and unique external influence requiring 
organizational responsiveness and flexibility. A notable business and regulatory group 
interaction has revolved around the enforcement of environmental policies. (Earnhart, 2009) 
The regulatory group is comprised of the following sub-components: regulatory modifications; 
regulatory innovations, and regulatory enforcement. The sub-components create a plethora of 
opportunities for interaction between the regulatory group external influence and organizations. 
New business system innovations can trigger interactions through each of the sub-components 
listed above; however, regulatory enforcement is typically the origination of interactions between 
the regulatory group external influence and new business system innovations. New business 
system innovations are obligated to adhere to existing regulations associated with new 
structural elements and/or technological innovations. Regulatory groups monitor organizational 
submissions for adherence with regulations. Often, the voluntary compliance of organizational 
submissions results in the identification of new business system innovations for regulatory 
groups. The standard regulatory group process is often referred to as the regulation dilemma, 
because it places stress on the regulatory group and the firm. Regulatory groups have to 
choose between the use of deterrent regulatory enforcement strategies or flexible enforcement 
strategies. In conjunction, the firm has to weigh the cost of evasion versus self-policing. 
(Potoski, 2004).  
An organization’s ability to respond and its level of flexibility in addressing regulatory 
enforcement is constrained by the number of inspections performed and whether the regulatory 
group is using distributive enforcement or focused enforcement. (Atlas, 2007) The overall 




high enforcement state. In addition to a classification based upon number of inspections, states 
will employ different strategies for the selection of facilities to inspect. 
 Enforcement strategies are composed of two components: number of inspections and 
facility selection. (Potoski, 2004) Variations in these components results in different enforcement 
strategies, which have the potential to cause stresses for the firm, the regulatory group, and 
challenge overall enforcement. (Telle, 2009; Wu, 2009) From a firm perspective, different 
enforcement strategies create the imposition of a large number of contingencies on their 
organizational structure from external influences and/or a high-level of congestion from within 
the organizational system due to adaptation to external influences, known as regulatory choke 
points. It is speculated regulatory choke points occur as a result of the enforcement strategies 
used by regulatory groups interacting with the structural elements of the organizational system.  
3.2 Regulatory Enforcement and Big Box 
Equivocally, the Big Box business system innovation has high levels of complexity, 
variability, and unpredictability. Additionally, the Big Box business system innovation is a 
distributive structural system due to the distribution of mass quantities of diverse products and 
the copious number of facility locations in different states. (Thompson, 1967) Due to the 
distributive structural system of the Big Box business system innovation, one would expect the 
regulatory group to use distributive enforcement activities as an adaptation mechanism. This 
raises questions concerning the nature of the regulatory enforcement experienced by the Big 
Box business system innovation, which is largely unknown. The ability for a firm to effectively 
create mechanisms to address impacts associated with enforcement events is dependent upon 
being able to either identify or predict the type of enforcement strategy used. If a firm is unable 
to ascertain the influences of the regulatory group on the structural system components, the 
level of uncertainty for the firm increases leading to risks for the viability of the organization. 
(Wu, 2009) Regulatory enforcement can directly and indirectly impact the operations of an 




Ensuring compliance across the magnitude of facility locations associated with the Big 
Box business system innovation could result in stresses to the regulatory enforcement 
capabilities of federal, state, county, and municipal regulatory groups. It is anticipated that 
stresses applied to the regulatory enforcement system would result in the use of adaptation 
strategies by regulatory groups. (Telle, 2009; Wu, 2009) It is hypothesized the unique 
organizational structure of Big Box business system innovation has resulted in different 





CHAPTER 4: HYPOTHESIS 
 
 
The purpose of RCRA is to assess the total quantities of hazardous waste materials and 
universal waste materials generated by facilities monthly and yearly. In terms of contingency 
theory, the Big Box business system innovation created a distributive organizational system 
comprised of facilities with operations sufficient in size to generate quantities of hazardous 
waste materials in monthly and/or yearly quantities triggering the application and subsequent 
enforcement of RCRA. The hypothesis tested in this study is as follows: 
Distributed structural organizational systems create distributed, but large, 
concentrations of hazardous wastes and universal wastes and, thus, will 






CHAPTER 5: METHODS 
 
 
This research will employ an embedded comparative case study design using the 
comparison of two Big Box firms across high-enforcement and low-enforcement states to 
identify within case variance and between case variance. To facilitate a detailed analysis of the 
data, state enforcement strategies will consist of embedded cases of high-enforcement and low-
enforcement states. These two embedded cases were selected due to the lack of defined 
separation between state enforcement strategies and the enforcement events. The purpose of 
this research is to examine the following research question: how has enforcement of RCRA 
adapted to the Big Box business system innovation?  
5.1 Research Design 
 The research conducted herein is qualitative in design. An embedded case study 
approach was chosen to facilitate the use of qualitative data to identify emerging patterns 
pertaining to regulatory enforcement of a new business system innovation to develop a 
contextual understanding of the outcomes recorded by EPA. The research was designed to 
discover the regulatory enforcement strategies used by states administering RCRA for the Big 
Box business system innovation and extrapolate the impact of the dynamic relationship between 
regulatory agencies and firms. The research is approached from a firm approach instead of a 
facility approach. The firm approach allows the analysis of aggregated data collected across the 
organizational system of the firm to understand the impact to the overall system instead of 
impacts to specific facilities within the system. (Earnhart, 2009) 
 Contingency theory was used to develop a framework for understanding the basis of the 
interactions occurring between the Big Box business system innovation and the EPA in terms of 
structural and external influences. Additionally, contingency theory facilitated the development 




by providing the foundation of understating distributive organizational systems and external 
influences.  
 The data used in this research was collected and compiled by third-parties. Firm data 
was obtained through review of archival publicly-available organizational documents, such as 
firm-managed websites and annual reports. The independent variables obtained were: variety of 
products; number of facility locations; operations in 10+ states; evidence of innovative business 
practices; facility size; and annual revenues. Review of these independent variables facilitated 
the selection the following firms: Walmart Stores, Inc. and Target Corporation.  
 The enforcement event data was obtained through the EPA ECHO system, which 
provides publicly-available data reported from states to EPA. The dependent variable obtained 
was number of inspections reported over a five year period to EPA by state agencies. State 
enforcement strategies were determined based upon review of archival regulatory information 
contained with SRF reports and the ECHO database, as well as review of state-maintained 
websites. Review of the SRF and ECHO data, facilitated the classification and selection of the 
following states: Arizona and Texas as low enforcement states; Kentucky and Missouri as high 
enforcement states. 
 The data obtained was analyzed to provide the ratio of inspection frequencies and 
aggregate inspection ratios for each firm nationally and across the four selected states. In 
addition, the firms were combined into a single data set to simulate a representation of the Big 
Box business system innovation. The Big Box business system innovation was, also, analyzed 
to provide the ratio of inspection frequencies and aggregate inspection ratios nationally and 
across the four selected states 
5.1.1 Threats to Validity and Generalizability 
 There are a variety of extrinsic selection factors with the potential of affecting the internal 
validity of the research. Matching of the selection of firms and states was performed by the use 




represent a large firm and a small firm of the same Big Box business system innovation 
category: discounters. Similarly, the overall state size of reported active SQGs was reviewed to 
ensure the states used were commensurate in size of their regulated community. It is 
acknowledged that selection-based rival variables exist, such as exclusion of non-size based 
structural elements, which were not controlled in this research design.  
 There are a variety of intrinsic factors with the potential of affecting the internal validity of 
the research: history, maturation, and instrumentation. Each of these factors could be directly 
associated with influencing the state enforcement strategies to change or evolve over the five 
year period representing the inspection data used for the dependent variable. A prime example 
would be the NPM guidance published yearly by EPA, which has the potential to result in subtle 
and/or extreme changes to state enforcement strategies ultimately impacting the inspection 
dependent variable. It is acknowledged that intrinsic-based rival variables exist, such as states 
operating without defined enforcement strategies; the occurrence of no enforcement events by a 
state; and states utilizing a dual distributed, focused enforcement strategy, which were not 
controlled in this research design.  
 The conceptual design of regulatory enforcement strategies leading to regulatory choke 
points is generalizable to organizations using a distributive organizational structure. However, it 
would likely be limited in organizations with other forms of organizational structures. 
Additionally, the classification of the selected states enforcement strategies is only applicable in 
the context of this research design with said variables, because states may utilize different state 
enforcement strategies for different firms and/or industries. 
5.2 Logic Model 
The embedded comparative case study design will be structured according to the 
variable depicted in the logic model below to determine if regulatory choke points are emerging 
due to state enforcement strategies of RCRA in the Big Box business system innovation. The 




emergence of regulatory choke points from the firm perspective. The firm perspective is an 
aggregate view of regulatory enforcement events experienced by a firm overall instead of 
utilizing a micro perspective from the point of individual facility locations. The use of the 
embedded variable, state enforcement strategies will have within case variance and between 
case variance. The logic model depicts the interactions between the variables presented in 
Table 1 below, which are depicted in Figure 3. 
 







Inspection Dependent External influence EPA ECHO database 
Innovation of Organizational Structure 
 Extensive variety of Products 
 Number of facility locations 
 Operations in 10+ states 
 Innovative business practices 
 Facility size 
 Revenue 
Independent Structural elements 
Archival firm 
information 













5.2.1 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable, inspections, represents the regulatory enforcement event used 
to determine the type of enforcement strategies used by states and lay the foundation for 
determining if a regulatory choke point is occurring. The inspection variable represents the 
count of inspections reported by a state over a five year period and originates out of external 
influence from regulatory groups.  
5.2.2 Independent Variables 
The independent variables represent the innovation of the organizational structure and 
the size of the organization structure in terms of contingency theory. I have the total number of 
facilities by state and classified structural element reported by the firm and ECHO; the reported 
number of products offered within a particular store platform; the average size of particular store 
platforms; annual revenues; and assessment of the historical and continual use of innovative 
business practices.  
5.2.3 State Enforcement Strategies 
State enforcement strategies are a rival, embedded variable which this research has 
controlled through the assessment and characterization of states as low and high enforcement. 
The overall number of inspections performed allows a state to be classified as a low 
enforcement and a high enforcement state. Both of these enforcement strategies are a deterrent 
enforcement strategy. (Potoski, 2004) 
5.2.4 Regulatory Enforcement Types and Choke Points 
There are three types of regulatory enforcement2: minimal enforcement, distributive 
enforcement; and focused enforcement. Minimal enforcement is characterized as enforcement 
events occurring so infrequently negligible impact occurs to the organizational system and does 
                                               
2
 It is worth noting that a determination of regulatory applicability does not mean the organization will experience 
regulatory enforcement activities. With the sheer numbers of regulated facilities throughout the US, it is possible 
that facilities adhering to regulatory submission requirements will never trigger a regulatory enforcement event or 
be randomly selected for an enforcement event. EPA does not establish universal inspection percentages; the 
percentage of regulatory enforcement events is determined at the state/territory level and varies according to the 




not lead to emergence of a regulatory choke point. Distributive enforcement is when a 
regulatory agency conducts enforcement events across all structural elements of the system on 
a regular frequency. Focused enforcement is when a regulatory agency targets specific facility 
locations for enforcement events on a regular frequency. Distributive and focused enforcement 
events have the potential to lead to the emergence of regulatory choke points; however, the use 
of these enforcement strategies does not guarantee the emergence of a regulatory choke point. 
In order for a regulatory choke point to occur, the additional characteristic of listed below must 
also occur. 
A chronic regulatory choke point occurs when the magnitude of inspected facilities 
across the entire organizational system is large and the regulatory group uses distributive 
enforcement. A chronic choke point results in congestion of the business system. An acute 
choke point occurs when a high-level of repeated inspections occur at particular facilities and 
the regulatory group uses focused enforcement. This high incidence of regulatory enforcement 
can result in a risk to the business system. Additionally, a firm experiencing chronic and/or acute 
regulatory choke points can experience fluctuations between the two different types of choke 
points or a transition from one type of choke point to the other.  
Due to the complexity of external influence, the potential exists for other rival variables. 
Known rival variables not controlled in this study are, but not limited to: 1) the occurrence of no 
enforcement events by a state; 2) emergence of a combination of acute and chronic 
enforcement events; 3) the lack of state enforcement strategies; and 4) non-size-based 
structural elements. 
5.3 Enforcement and Compliance History Online (ECHO) Data 
The inspection data used in this study was obtained through the EPA ECHO3 system 
(US Environmental Protection Agency, 2010a). ECHO represents a compilation of compliance 
                                               
3
 The accuracy of the information obtained from ECHO is not guaranteed. An example of inaccurate reporting 




and enforcement records pertaining to facilities regulated by federal, state and/or local 
agencies, such as Clean Air Act stationary sources, Clean Water Act permitted dischargers, and 
RCRA hazardous waste generators entered into EPA national databases. The EPA national 
databases of interest for this study are the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
Information System (RCRAInfo) and the supplemental Federal-only database Integrated 
Compliance Information System. EPA reports the databases are “copied monthly into the 
Integrated Data for Enforcement Analysis system and made available in the ECHO Web 
interface to allow internet access to integrated data.” (US Environmental Protection Agency, 
2010a) The information contained within the ECHO database does not provide facility-level 
information pertaining to observations made during an inspection event. Therefore, I have more 
complete data regarding the size structural elements and the aggregate inspections performed 
at the firm level. Table 2 provides a list of the data variables obtained from ECHO and 
generated by the researcher. 
Table 2. Data variables obtained from ECHO and researcher generated 
Data Variable Origination of Data Timeframe of Data 
Facility Name EPA Form 8700-12 Current 
Facility Street EPA Form 8700-12 Current 
Facility City EPA Form 8700-12 Current 
Facility State EPA Form 8700-12 Current 
Facility ZIP Code EPA Form 8700-12 Current 
Program ID# State Databases Current 
Inspections
4
 State Databases 5 yrs 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
years for any of the retailers selected. However, the State of California settled an environmental lawsuit against 
Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. in 2007 for $9.9 million and filed an environmental lawsuit against Target Corporation in 
2009 for $8.65 million. Environmental enforcement events are the foundation for determining the violation of 
environmental regulations leading to lawsuits; therefore, it is with conviction that I state California inspected a 
percentage of the facilities listed within the ECHO database. The extensive nature of the criteria for selection for 
states was developed to attempt to exclude states with suspect and/or inaccurate reporting information from the 
research. Therefore, the data provided by the ECHO database system is not robust due to reporting 
inconsistencies by states and territories. All the variables are restricted by the information reported and managed 
by state and federal agencies. 
4
 There are inherent limitations to the data obtained through ECHO. The “inspections” variable provides information 
pertaining to the number of facility inspections within the past 5 years; however, the frequency of the inspections is 
not provided. For example, if a facility has been inspected five times in the past years, one does not know if the 
inspections occurred one per year or were clustered surrounding a particular environmental violation. This lack of 
distinction limits the ability to determine if an individual facility is experiencing minimal, chronic, and/or acute 
enforcement. However, the lack of distinction does not preclude the assessment of minimal, chronic, and/or acute 




Obtaining the variable information provided in Table 2 above facilitated the generation of 
the structural element variable. The structural element variable was generated by the 
researcher for classification of facilities by contingency theory structural elements of the 
organizational system: distribution center, store, return center, and corporate facilities. 
Identification and classification of the structural element was performed by verifying facility 
address location and facility identification numbers from firm-managed websites, firm-managed 
materials, and review of aerial photographs. Table 3 provides the structural element variables 
generated. 
Table 3. Structural element variables generated by researcher  
Generated Data Variable Origination of Data Timeframe of Data 
Structural element 
 Distribution Center 
 Store 
 Return Center 
 Corporate facilities 
Classification by researcher N/A 
 
5.4 Firm Selection 
For the purpose of this study, the following Big Box retailers have been selected: 
Walmart Stores, Inc. and Target Corporation. The selection of these firms was based upon a 
variety of criteria established in contingency theory. The criteria selected below addresses the 
Big Box retail industry’s perpetual increase in the size of structural elements comprising the 
organizational system and the prevalence of the use of innovation. First, the selected firm’s 
organizational structural elements had to conform to the Big Box retail system logic model 
established using contingency theory provided in Figure 1, which is consistent for the retailers 
selected. Second, the organization had to meet the distinguishing characteristics of a Big Box 
business system innovation of: 1) number of facility locations; 2) facility sizes ranging between 
90,000 to 200,000+ square feet; 3) extensive variety of products; and 4) classification as a 




within the top five retail establishments in the 2009 STORES Top 100 Retailers5 list. Fourth, the 
firm was ranked within the top five favorite online retailers in the 2009 STORES Favorite 50 
Online Retailers6 list. Fifth, the firms were selected to represent the same type of Big Box retail 
system: discounters. Sixth, the firms were selected to represent a large discounter and a small 
discounter based upon total number of facility locations. Table 4 provides the selection criteria 
and results below.  
 
Table 4. Selection criteria by firm. 































3,503 Yes Yes Yes 1 2 Discounter 
Target 
Corporation 
1,777 Yes Yes Yes 5 6
8
  Discounter 
 
 
5.5 State Selection 
For the embedded analysis, the following states have been selected: Arkansas, 
Kentucky, Missouri, and Texas. To be able to classify a state as a high enforcement and low 
enforcement state, the following criteria were established and analyzed, which in turn facilitated 
the creation of the state enforcement strategy variables low enforcement and high 
enforcement9. Each state is required to undergo the State Review Framework (SRF) for 
assessment of state performance in regards to program effectiveness, identification of areas for 
the improvement of program management practices, and to ensure fair and consistent 
                                               
5
 “The STORES Top 100 Retailers are ranked by annual revenues as reported in SEC filings, public statements by 
the companies and, where noted, estimates based on Planet Retail research.” (Schulz, 2009) 
6
 The STORES Favorite 50 Online Retailers are ranked according to consumer surveys conducted by Netezza. 
(Reda, 2009) 
7
 Firm information obtained from the following sources: (Wal-mart Stores Inc., 2010a), (Target Corporation, 2010b), 
(Schulz, 2009), (Reda, 2009) 
8
 Target Corporation did not satisfy the requirements for selection regarding ranking as an online retailer; however, it 
was determined the ranking of six was not significant enough to warrant exclusion. 
9
 The determination of state enforcement strategies relied on the use of SRF reviews conducted by EPA due to the 
lack of publicly-available information on state websites regarding enforcement strategies. The possibility exists that 
the determination of enforcement strategy could be in opposition to the state’s recognized enforcement strategy. 




enforcement and compliance across all regions and states. (US Environmental Protection 
Agency, 2010a) The selection of these states was based upon an assessment of both SRF data 
and ECHO data.  
First, the SRF Trend Reports were reviewed to determine the inspection coverage for 
active small quantity generators (SQGs) from 2004 to 2008. Second, the SRF multi-state report 
was reviewed to determine the inspection coverage of active Small Quantity Generators (SQGs) 
from 2004 to 2008. For the criteria listed above, a high enforcement state is classified as a state 
exceeding 20% inspection coverage and a low enforcement state is classified as a state with 
inspection coverage below 20%. 
Third, to be consistent with selection criteria for the firms, the states were selected 
based upon total number of SQG facility locations. A 15% variation between total numbers of 
SQG facility locations was considered sufficient for comparative purposes. Fourth, the number 
of total firm locations for both Walmart and Target reported in ECHO had to exceed 100. Fifth, 
the ratio of firm locations to inspections reported in ECHO had to exceed 50% for high 
enforcement states and be below 5% for low enforcement states with inspections performed10. 
Table 5 provides the selection criteria and results below.  
  
                                               
10
 The following states reported no inspections of Walmart and Target facilities within the past five years: CA, DC, HI, 
LA, MD, MS, NE, and VT. Due to the lack of inspections reported within the ECHO database, these states were 




Table 5. Classification of enforcement strategies by state11. 




 Inspection % coverage of active SQGs  










AR 8.8% 11.3% 11.0% 11.0% 12.2% 343 11.7% 125 2.4% Low 




 92.7% High 









TX 11.1% 11.1% 11.6% 12.6% 13.7% 2852 14.7% 554 1.3% Low 
 
 
After classification of the states according to SRF and ECHO data as low and high 
enforcement states, the classifications of the states were compared with the agency’s mission 
statement and philosophy, which are presented in Table 5.  “Race-to-the-bottom” regulatory 
theory looks at the effect of interstate competition for industry resulting in leniency of 
environmental regulations. In contrast, “Race-to-the-top” regulatory theory suggests states 
actively seek out less pollution-intensive industries through active enforcement and activities. It 
is suggested a citizen-centered approach closely resembles a “race-to-the-top” approach toward 
regulatory enforcement while “race-to-the-bottom” resembles a collaborative-centered 
approach. A state’s mission and policies should typically reflect a state’s use of either a race-to-
the-bottom or a race-to-the-top approach towards regulatory enforcement. (Konisky, 2007) 
  
                                               
11 Information obtained from: (US Environmental Protection Agency, 2010a, 2010b) 
12
 Kentucky did not satisfy the requirements for selection regarding a 15% variation for the total number of SQG 
facility locations with Arkansas. The 15% variation represented facilities with total number of SQG facility locations 
ranging from 344 to 466. It was determined the total number of SQG facility locations at 343 was not significant 
enough to warrant exclusion. 
13
 Kentucky did not satisfy the requirements for selection regarding total number of firms reported in the ECHO data 
for Walmart and Target to exceed 100. It was determined the total number of firms reported of 96 was not 
significant enough to warrant exclusion. 
14
 Missouri did not satisfy the requirements for selection regarding inspection percentage coverage of active SQGs at 
20%; however, it was determined the percentage coverage of 19.6% was not significant enough to warrant 
exclusion. 
15
 Missouri did not satisfy the requirements for selection regarding the ratio of firm locations to inspections reported in 
ECHO to exceed 50% for high enforcement states. It was determined 39.9% was significantly outside the 
established protocol; however, review of the ECHO data indicated no other states, with the exclusion of Kentucky, 




Table 6. Agency mission and philosophy by state16 
State Agency Mission Agency Philosophy 
Arizona Department of 
Environmental Quality 
“To protect and enhance public health, 
welfare and the environment in Arizona.” 
“… ADEQ today administers a variety of 
programs to improve the health and welfare 
of our citizens and ensure the quality of 
Arizona’s air, land, and water resources 




“To protect and enhance Kentucky's 
environment. This mission is important 
because it has a direct impact on 
Kentucky's public health, our citizens' 
safety and the quality of Kentucky's 
valuable natural resources - our 
environment.” 
“…Kentucky’s residents and businesses 
must work together to preserve the resource 
quality and diversity that make Kentucky a 
great place to live, work and play. … By 
working together, we will successfully keep 
Kentucky's environment as one of our 
greatest treasures “ 
Missouri Department of 
Natural Resources 
“To protect, preserve and enhance 
Missouri's natural, cultural and energy 
resources” 
“…The department deals with the critical 
area of energy, helps develop mineral 
resources in an environmentally safe 
manner, protects Missouri's land, air and 
water resources and works to preserve the 
state's historic and natural heritage through 
state parks and state historic sites” 
Texas Commission on 
Environmental Quality 
“Strives to protect our state's human and 
natural resources consistent with 
sustainable economic development. Our 
goal is clean air, clean water, and the 
safe management of waste.” 
“…we will: …ensure that regulations are 
necessary, effective, and current; apply 
regulations clearly and consistently; ensure 
consistent, just, and timely enforcement 
when environmental laws are violated; 
promote and foster voluntary compliance 
with environmental laws and provide 




Review of the agency missions and philosophies reveals two trends: 1) a citizen-
centered approach and 2) a collaborative-centered approach. Arizona and Missouri take a 
citizen-centered approach whereas Kentucky and Texas clearly attempt to have a collaborative 
approach with businesses. Therefore, the classification of states as high and low enforcement 
does not appear to be directly related to the agency’s mission statement and philosophies. 
Additionally, the selection of states has resulted in opposing comparisons with Arizona and 
Texas classified as low enforcement states with divergent philosophies and Kentucky and 
Missouri as high enforcement states with divergent philosophies. 
  
                                               
16
 Information obtained from: (Arizona Department of Environmental Quality, 2010; Kentucky Department for 
Environmental Protection, 2010; Missouri Department of Natural Resources, 2010; Texas Commission on 




CHAPTER 6: HISTORY OF THE BIG BOX BUSINESS SYSTEM INNOVATION 
 
 
The retail industry has a varied extensive background in the US. At the turn of the 19th 
century, the reliance on retailers for the acquisition of goods and services was firmly 
established. In the mid-19th century, the department store, chain store, and mail-order business 
began to emerge in the marketplace. The chain store foundation revolved around the ability to 
provide similar types of merchandise while maintaining low overhead operational costs.  
Fundamentals of the early-Big Box retail chains maintained the low overhead costs of 
the chains store through the development of stores using boilerplate, large, single-floor 
structures in undeveloped or underdeveloped areas. By 1962, Walmart, K-mart, and Target 
were established retail organizations utilizing a chain store organizational platform. The key 
differences between the chain store organization and the Big Box business system innovation 
are the expansion of products to include related products and the increased quantity and variety 
of products. By the 1990s, the Big Box retail chains started to focus on consumers and markets 
by stepping away from the boilerplate store structure towards a more appealing consumer and 
product-focused experience. (Hendrickson, 1979; Lebhar, 1963; Spector, 2005)  
The retail industry is currently comprised of many different types of businesses; 
however, the appearance of the “Big Box” sector has transformed the US landscape and 
business operations. “Big Box” retailers are categorized into three different categories: 1) 
category killers, 2) discounters, and 3) warehouse clubs (Hahn, 2000). Category killers are 
classified as chains with niche specializations, such as, but not limited to, The Home Depot, 
Office Depot, and PetSmart. Discounters are classified as chains providing products at reduced 
prices, such as, but not limited to, Walmart, Target, and K-mart. Warehouse clubs are classified 
as chains providing products in larger quantities than observed at traditional department stores 





CHAPTER 7: RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY ACT 
 
 
7.1 Legislative Review 
RCRA was enacted as P.L. 94-580 in 1976. The act was “to provide technical and 
financial assistance for the development of management plans and facilities for the recovery of 
energy and other resources from discarded materials, for the safe disposal of discarded 
materials, and to regulate the management of hazardous waste” (The Library of Congress, 
1976). In 1980, RCRA was promulgated in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) in sections 
262 and 263 of Title 40: Protection of the Environment. In 1984, amendments to RCRA were 
enacted as P.L. 98-616 (United States, 1984) and promulgated as 40 CFR §260 to §265. Since 
1984, RCRA has experienced minor regulatory changes. From a contingency theory 
perspective, the enforcement of RCRA is associated with the regulatory group external 
influence. 
RCRA was passed to “express the intent and findings of Congress that alternative 
energy sources for public and private consumption are necessary to reduce dependence on 
petroleum, natural gas, and nuclear and hydroelectric generations as a power source. 
Establishes the objective of establishing a cooperative effort to recover potential energy sources 
and other valuable materials from discarded material “ (The Library of Congress, 1976).  
In addition, the 1976 P.L. required the following: 1) development of guidelines for solid 
waste management; 2) publishing of guidelines for solid waste management; 3) establishment 
of criteria for identifying hazardous waste materials; 4) development of standards to seasonably 
protect human health from hazardous waste; 5) establish standards for State hazardous waste 
programs; and 6) establish procedures for federal enforcement of hazardous waste regulations. 
(The Library of Congress, 1976) 
The 1984 P.L. amendments required the following key provisions to RCRA: 1) revision of 




system analysis associated with small quantity waste generators; 3) develop minimization 
guidelines for hazardous wastes; and 4) development of federal enforcement provisions for 
hazardous waste management. (The Library of Congress, 1984) 
7.2 Intent of RCRA 
One of the difficulties with regulation is often in the determination of the extent the scope 
of the regulation will impact organizations and businesses, which become the regulated 
community. In 1980, EPA began publishing guidance documents for the regulated community to 
provide clarification on RCRA regulations. In the Hazardous Waste Information pamphlet (1980, 
p. 1), EPA stated “unavoidably generated in the production of many common 
materials…hazardous waste emerged in the late 1970's as a national health and environmental 
concern. Agriculture, hospitals, laboratories, and governmental activities also generate 
hazardous wastes.”  RCRA encompasses “facilities typically thought of as hazardous waste 
generators, such as industrial manufacturers, but also government agencies and small 
businesses, such as a local dry cleaner generating small amounts of hazardous solvents, or a 
gas station with underground petroleum tanks” (US Environmental Protection Agency, 2008b, 
pp. I-5).  
Guidance documents provided by EPA are clear in regards to the applicability of RCRA 
to the generation of hazardous wastes through the productions of materials by industrial 
operations and/or activities. The identification of the regulated community in terms of industrial 
processes, operations, and/or activities and/or generation associated with processes, 
operations, and/or activities is consistent throughout the documents from 1980 to 2008. In 2008, 
the use of the word “commercial” was introduced into the guidance documents in relation to the 
definition of a solid waste.  
Specifically, the document stated: “RCRA defines the term solid waste as: … Other 
discarded materials, including solid, semisolid, liquid, or contained gaseous materials resulting 




(US Environmental Protection Agency, 2008b, p. II2). In comparison, 40 CFR §261.2 states the 
following: 
 
(a) (1) A solid waste is any discarded material that is not excluded under §261.4(a) or 
that is not excluded by a variance granted under §§260.30 and 260.31 or that is not 
excluded by a non-waste determination under §§260.30 and 260.34. 
 
(2)(i) A discarded material is any material which is: 
 (A) Abandoned, as explained in paragraph (b) of this section; or 
 (B) Recycled, as explained in paragraph (c) of this section; or 
 (C) Considered inherently waste-like, as explained in paragraph (d) of this 
section; or 
 (D) A military munition identified as a solid waste in §266.202. 
 
(b) Materials are solid waste if they are abandoned by being: 
 (1) Disposed of; or 
 (2) Burned or incinerated; or 
 (3) Accumulated, stored, or treated (but not recycled) before or in lieu of being 
abandoned by being disposed of, burned, or incinerated. 
 
The codified definition of solid waste provided at 40 CFR §261.2(a),(b) does not 
specifically identify types of organizations in association with the determination of solid waste. 
The evolution of organizational types used within the definition of solid waste in guidance 
documents has changed drastically over the years. To complicate the confusion presented by 
the guidance documents, definitions for the following, at a minimum, are not provided in the 
codified regulations or the guidance documents: industry, commercial, operation, and/or 
activities.  
In 1980, the organizations identified industrial manufactures (i.e. production of many 
common materials), agriculture, hospitals, laboratories, and governmental activities were clearly 
associated with organizations generating hazardous wastes through the productions of 
materials by operations and/or activities. By 2008, the organizations were identified industrial, 
commercial, mining, agricultural, and community activities. Industrial, mining, and agricultural 
activities continue to be organizations generating hazardous wastes through the productions of 




organizations generating hazardous wastes through operations and/or activities, exclusive of 
the productions of materials.  
The clear introduction and migration of terms regarding applicability to organizational 
types indicates a potential divergence from the original intent of RCRA. This migration and 
intent divergence brings to the forefront questions regarding the impact of RCRA enforcement 
on the Big Box business system innovation. The conflict between the intent and impact of RCRA 
to the Big Box business system innovation has not been addressed and has policy implications 
at a national, state, and/or local level. As existing US environmental regulations age, it is 
questionable whether the enforcement of the regulations will be able to adequately address the 
environmental concerns associated with new business system innovations without causing 
excessive impacts to organizations. Therefore, it is arguable that business system innovations 
stress the enforcement of regulations. 
7.3 RCRA and Enforcement 
 RCRA is administered by EPA while being managed and implemented by state and 
territory governments. Currently, 50 states and territories have received state authorization for 
the implementation of RCRA. (Atlas, 2007; US Environmental Protection Agency, 2010c). Due 
to the extensive nature of the RCRA regulations and the prevalence of implementation on a 
national-scale, this research will utilize RCRA as the environmental policy associated with the 
environmental factor regulatory groups.  
The EPA Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance (OECA) is tasked with the 
development of short-term and long-term strategic plans for EPA and associated state/territory 
agencies. OECA publishes the National Program Managers (NPM) Guidance document on a 
revolving three year cycle supplemented with annual updates. The NPM is the primary long-
term planning document used to establish the basis for national program priorities and activities 
for the enforcement and compliance assurance program. Using the time span of the ECHO 




factors states should consider in developing compliance and enforcement activities. The factors 
have remained relatively consistent from 2005 to 2010 recommending the focusing of 
enforcement activities as follows: 
1) Never inspected generators;  
2) Facilities that are significant non-compliers;  
3) Facilities that are the subject of citizen complaints;  
4) Non-notifier facilities that are believed to be generating hazardous waste;  
5) Persons that generate, transport, treat, store, or dispose of significant quantities of 
hazardous wastes, in particular those in proximity to population centers or 
environmentally sensitive areas; and  
6) Recalcitrant or repeat violators.   
 Priority five would indicate a national compliance and enforcement strategy applicable to 
the Big Box business system innovation due to an emphasis placed on locations with “proximity 
to population centers”. (US Environmental Protection Agency, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008a, 
2009) It is expected the enforcement strategies and priorities used by the states will vary in their 
enforcement levels from low to high enforcement. The difference of implementation strategies of 
a regulation by 50 different states and territories drastically increases the uncertainty and 
variability associated with enforcement strategies. (Atlas, 2007) 
 In addition, states and territories with authorization for the implementation of RCRA are 
able to codify and expound the requirements of RCRA as state statutes and laws. Therefore, in 
addition to the base requirements of RCRA, organizations are subject to additional state 
regulations to ensure compliance. These factors increase the uncertainty of an organization’s 
structural elements due to the high degree of variability associated with the influence of the 
regulatory group external influence due to the enforcement and implementation of RCRA and 
associated state statues. It is hypothesized the trigger for enforcement of RCRA will experience 




 The RCRA regulations commonly impact business operations associated with 
implementation of hazardous waste classification, storage, and disposal. From a contingency 
theory perspective, these aspects are associated with size of the organization. Examples of 
implementation of RCRA observed as aspects of size are: cumulative hazardous waste storage 
quantities; cumulative hazardous waste yearly disposal quantities; and variance in the diversity, 
quantity, and scaling of hazardous waste products maintained on-site. Figure 4 depicts the 
potential RCRA interactions of the Big Box retail system, standard retail system, and standard 
industrial systems. 
 
Figure 4. Big Box retail system, standard retail system, and standard industrial system 




The standard industrial system has four potential interactions associated with RCRA 




RCRA enforcement. In comparison, the Big Box retail system has 10 potential interactions 
associated with RCRA enforcement. Table 7 below quantifies the potential RCRA interactions in 
term of structural element depicted in Figure 4 above. 
 









Standard Industrial System N/A 4 N/A 1 5 
Standard Retail System N/A 2 N/A 1 3 
Big Box Retail System 3 3 4 1 11 
 
 
The standard industrial system and standard retail system experience 80% and 66%, 
respectively, of potential RCRA enforcement interaction within a single structural element. The 
remaining potential RCRA enforcement interaction occurs in the corporate element for the 
standard industrial system at 20% and the standard retail system at 33%. In comparison, the 
Big Box retail system experiences 90% of potential RCRA enforcement interactions across 
three integral structural elements. The corporate structural element represents 9% of potential 
RCRA enforcement. The high percentage of potential RCRA interactions occurring within the 
integral structural elements can have substantial impacts to the Big Box retail system. 
 To further complicate the implementation of RCRA, the enforcement process is 
hypothesized to occur through formal and informal processes. The formal process of 
enforcement of RCRA is centered around the monitoring of the base application of the RCRA 
regulations through required organizational submissions, such as, but not limited to notifications 
of hazardous waste activities and/or yearly reports, to state and federal agencies. These base 
requirements of the RCRA regulations are linked with the organizational size components listed 
above. If one of the size components listed above exceeds codified requirements, it triggers the 
beginning of the enforcement process. It is suggested that informal monitoring is performed of 
additional organizational size components of the Big Box business system innovation, such as 




These components are not intrinsically linked through codification of RCRA regulations; 
however, it is suggested they are linked to the current environmental political climate of the 
states and EPA. Informal enforcement monitoring is perceived as a rival variable and will not be 









8.1.1 Firm History and Innovation 
Walmart’s core mission, “We save people money so they can live better”, is at the heart 
of the growth Walmart has exhibited and pursued since 1962. Since the opening of Walmart’s 
first store in Rogers, Arkansas, Walmart has encouraged growth and innovation in the retail 
industry. By the mid-1970s, Walmart quickly embraced the innovation associated with the 
emergence of the Big Box business system innovation through growth in facility locations and 
advances in product distribution; product and service differentiation; product processing 
services; and communications. Walmart has grown domestically to have facility locations in the 
50 US states and many US territories. Financially Walmart has grown from sales of $340.3 
million in 1975 to $401.2 billion in 2009. (Wal-mart Stores Inc., 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010a, 
2010b) 
Walmart operates four store platforms: Supercenters, Discount Stores, Neighborhood 
Markets, and Sam’s Club. The store formats differ based upon square footage and number of 
items. The two platforms that meet the requirements of a Big Box business system innovation 
are the Supercenter with an average of 186,000 ft2 including approximately 142,000 products 
and the Discount Store with an average of 108,000 ft2 including approximately 120,000 
products. Furthermore, Walmart opened its first distribution center in Bentonville, Arkansas in 
1970 and continued to push the limit on size by opening the largest distribution center in 1980, 
commensurate with the time, in Palestine, Texas. The Supercenter and Discount Store 
organizational system adheres to the structural elements depicted in Figure 1. 
As early as 1978, Walmart was expanding the diversity of their product base and adding 
additional services, such as the Walmart pharmacy, auto service center, jewelry department, 




products to further capitalize on the ability to provide mass quantities of products at discount 
prices. (Wal-mart Stores Inc., 2010b) With the number of products carried by Walmart, many of 
the products can become hazardous wastes if the product is thrown away or the 
container/product is damaged causing the product to spill. Examples of products that could 
become hazardous or universal wastes found in retailers throughout the US are, but not limited 
to, concentrated cleaning supplies, drain cleaning products, make-up, fertilizers, soil with 
fertilizer additives, automotive engine oil, paint, compact fluorescent lamps, pool chemicals, and 
automotive batteries. These products, and many more, are the triggers for the RCRA 
enforcement points depicted in Figure 4. 
Technological innovations facilitated the development of the Walmart Satellite Network 
in 1987, which is the largest private satellite communication system in the United States. The 
network effectively connects the operating units of the company and the Home Office with two-
way voice, data, and one-way video communication. Embracing technological advancements in 
product processing systems, Walmart installed bar-code scanning capabilities in 99 percent of 
stores by 1988. (Wal-mart Stores Inc., 2010b) 
Walmart joined the fight for environmental sustainability and awareness in 1994 with the 
development of environmentally-friendly facilities intended to save energy, conserve natural 
resources, and reduce pollution. By 2005, environmental sustainability became one of 
Walmart’s core business missions and objectives. (Wal-mart Stores Inc., 2010b) By 2009, 
Walmart had developed the “Sustainability 360” program to become a leader in sustainability for 
the retail industry, as well as, “…take sustainability beyond our direct footprint to encompass 
Walmart’s associates, suppliers, communities, and customers” (Wal-mart Stores Inc., 2010a).  
8.1.2 Nationally 
The ECHO data reported a total of 3,284 facilities for Walmart across 48 states. ECHO 
reported 89 distribution centers, 3,176 stores, eight return centers, and 11 corporate facilities. 




per facility ranged from one visit to five visits, with a mean of 1.34 visits. Specifically, 290 
facilities were inspected once; 43 facilities were inspected twice; 17 facilities were inspected 
three times; 10 facilities were inspected four times; and four facilities were inspected 5 times. 
Based upon the ECHO data, the ratio of inspection frequency is 1:9.02, whereas the aggregate 
inspection ratio is 1:6.74. Therefore, across all states, Walmart received an inspection for 
approximately every six facilities with the inspections concentrated within the store structural 
element. 
8.1.3 Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, and Texas 
The ECHO data reported a total of 751 facilities for Walmart for the selected states: 
Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, and Texas. ECHO reported 29 distribution centers, 710 stores, 
four return centers, and eight corporate facilities. Walmart experienced 146 inspections over the 
past five years. The frequency of the inspections per facility ranged from one visit to five visits, 
with a mean of 1.39 visits. Specifically, 77 facilities were inspected once; 17 facilities were 
inspected twice; 10 facilities were inspected three times; and one facility was inspected 5 times. 
The high enforcement strategy states, Kentucky and Missouri, conducted 135 inspections and 
the low enforcement strategy states, Arkansas and Texas, conducted 11 inspections. 
Table 8 depicts a comparison of ECHO data and firm data pertaining to the number of 
facilities. The comparison of ECHO data depicts more store and return center locations than 
reported by the firm; however, the number of distribution centers is less than reported by the 
firm and the reported corporate office locations match. The inflated numbers for stores and 
return centers in the ECHO data confirms reporting errors within the ECHO system. It is 





Table 8. Number of facilities, inspections, and enforcement type by state17 
State 





 Firm Data 
DC Store RC Corp. DC Store RC Corp. ECHO Data 
Arkansas 11 96 3 7 20 80 0 7 3 Low 
Kentucky 2 90 0 0 2 84 0 0 87 High 
Missouri 3 118 0 0 3 119 0 0 48 High 
Texas 13 406 1 1 16 338 0 0 8 Low 
Total 29 710 4 8 41 621 0 7 146  
Total 751 669   
 
 
Table 9 depicts the incident of inspections by state and structural element for the past 
five years as reported in the ECHO database. Across the states, distribution centers were 
inspected twice; stores were inspected 140 times; return centers were inspected four times, and 
corporate facilities received no inspections. Comparing frequency of inspections across states, 
distribution centers and corporate facilities received no repeat inspections; however, a single 
return center in Arkansas was inspected three times and stores received repeat inspections. 
Based upon the ECHO data, the aggregate inspection ratio is 1:5.56 for the high enforcement 
states and the aggregate inspection ratio is 1:125.17 for the low enforcement states. 
Additionally, both the high enforcement and low enforcement state inspections were 
concentrated primarily within the store structural element. Therefore, Walmart received higher 
frequencies of inspections from the high enforcement states than low enforcement states. 
A review of Arkansas reveals 117 facilities reported in the ECHO database; however, 
minimal regulatory activity has occurred over the past five years with inspection of a single 
return center facility three times. Based upon the ECHO data, the ratio of inspection frequency 
is 1:3, whereas the aggregate inspection ratio is 1:1. Based upon review of the ECHO data, 
Arkansas showed a concentration of inspections within the return center structural element; 
however, this could be a misleading assessment due to the fact a single facility was inspected. 
                                               
17 Information obtained from: (US Environmental Protection Agency, 2010a; Wal-mart Stores Inc., 2010b) 
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 The Neighborhood Market and Sam’s Club platforms were not included in the ECHO data obtained due 




A review of Kentucky reveals 92 facilities reported in the ECHO database with the 
majority of inspection occurring at the store structural element with a single inspection of a 
distribution center. Based upon the ECHO data, the ratio of inspection frequency is 1:2 for 
distribution centers and 1:1.17 for stores. In comparison, the aggregate inspection ratio is 1:2 for 
distribution centers and 1:1.03 for stores. Based upon review of the ECHO data, Kentucky 
showed a concentration of inspections within the store structural element. 
A review of Missouri reveals 121 facilities reported in the ECHO database with the 
majority of inspection occurring at the store structural element with a single inspection of a 
distribution center. Based upon the ECHO data, the ratio of inspection frequency is 1:3 for 
distribution centers and 1:2.57 for stores. In comparison, the aggregate inspection ratio is 1:3 for 
distribution centers and 1:2.51 for stores. Based upon review of the ECHO data, Missouri 
showed a concentration of inspections within the store structural element. 
A review of Texas reveals 421 facilities reported in the ECHO database; however, 
minimal regulatory activity has occurred over the past five years with inspection of four stores 
and a single return center. Based upon the ECHO data, the ratio of inspection frequency is 
1:101.5 for stores and 1:1 for return centers. In comparison, the aggregate inspection ratio is 
1:58 for stores and 1:1 for return centers. Based upon review of the ECHO data, Texas showed 
a concentration of inspections within the return center structural element; however, this could be 







Table 9. Incident of inspections by state and structural element. 
State Structural element 





to Facility # 
Ratio of 
Aggregate Insp. 
per Facility # 1 2 3 5 
AR Distribution Center 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Store 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Return Center 0 0 1 0 1 1:3 1:1 
Corporate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Aggregate Insp. 0 0 3 0 3   
KY Distribution Center 1 0 0 0 1 1:2 1:2 
Store 27 15 8 1 51 1:1.7 1:1.03 
Return Center -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Corporate -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Total Aggregate Insp. 28 30 24 5 87   
MO Distribution Center 1 0 0 0 1 1:3 1:3 
Store 45 1 0 0 46 1:2.57 1:2.51 
Return Center -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Corporate -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Total Aggregate Insp. 46 2 0 0 48   
TX Distribution Center 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Store 2 1 1 0 4 1:101.5 1:58 
Return Center 1 0 0 0 1 1:1 1:1 
Corporate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 




8.2.1 Firm Innovation 
Target’s core mission, “Expect More. Pay Less”, is at the heart of Target’s growth and 
expansion. Since 1961, the founders of Target drove the retail industry towards the 
development of discount retail chains, which laid the foundation for the emergence of the Big 
Box business system innovation. Target has been on the cutting edge of the development of the 
core characteristics of the Big Box business system innovation through growth in facility 
locations and advances in product distribution; product and service differentiation; product 
processing services; and media. Target has grown domestically to have facility locations in 49 
US states. Financially Target has grown from annual sales of $1 billion in 1975 to $62.9 billion in 




Target operates two store platforms: General Merchandise stores and SuperTarget. The 
store formats differ based upon square footage and number of items. Both platforms meet the 
requirements of a Big Box business system innovation with an average of 126,000 ft2 and 
174,000 ft2, respectively. Target does not provide information pertaining to the number of 
products contained within each platform; however, they state they carry general merchandise 
and selected grocery products offering the convenience of one-stop shopping for customers. 
Target opened its first distribution center in Fridley, Minnesota in 1969. The organizational 
system for both the General Merchandise stores and SuperTarget conforms to the structural 
elements depicted in Figure 1. 
The foundation for the development of Target was to provide the "best of the fashion 
world with the best of the discount world” by having a retail store with more than 75 departments 
(Target Corporation, 2010a). Target has expanded the diversity of their product base through 
premier specialty brands, such as Archer Farms premium grocery products, Sonia Kashuk 
Professional Makeup Collection, Sutton & Dodge exclusive premium meat brand, and Choxie 
exclusive premium brand of chocolates. In 2001, Target introduced the “Market Pantry” brand 
products to further capitalize on the ability to provide mass quantities of quality products at 
discount prices. Target is, also, well-known for their collaborative efforts with designers to create 
exclusive product lines ranging from, but not limited to, kitchen goods to fashion to furniture. 
(Target Corporation, 2010a) The diversity of products carried by Target means many of the 
products can become hazardous wastes if the product is thrown away or the container/product 
is damaged causing the product to spill. Examples of products that could become hazardous or 
universal wastes found in retailers throughout the US are, but not limited to, concentrated 
cleaning supplies, drain cleaning products, make-up, fertilizers, soil with fertilizer additives, 
automotive engine oil, paint, compact fluorescent lamps, pool chemicals, and automotive 
batteries. These products, and many more, are the triggers for the RCRA enforcement points 




Target has embraced the use of media and technological innovations to further the 
growth of its enterprise. In 1974, Target began the use of planograms to accomplish a 
standardized product display to facilitate consistency across their stores. The first Target weekly 
newspaper advertisement appeared in 1975 and appeared online at www.target.com in 2000. 
Embracing technological advancements in product processing systems, Target was the first Big 
Box business system innovation to implement UPC bar-code scanning in 1988. (Target 
Corporation, 2010a) 
Target’s environmental commitments are centered on the following: providing eco-
friendly choices for consumers; maintaining regulatory compliance; recycling; reducing their 
carbon footprint; building sustainable facilities; and reducing waste from products and 
packaging. In 2006, Target decided to use recycled plastic in the construction of their shopping 
carts to reduce the environmental impacts associated with the construction of metal shopping 
carts. (Target Corporation, 2010a) 
8.2.2 Nationally 
The ECHO data reported a total of 1,484 facilities for Target across 49 states. ECHO 
reported 32 distribution centers, 1,438 stores, one return center, and 13 corporate facilities. 
Target experienced 134 inspections over the past five years. The frequency of the inspections 
per facility ranged from one visit to three visits, with a mean of 1.12 visits. Specifically, 108 
facilities were inspected once; 10 facilities were inspected twice; and two facilities were 
inspected three times. Based upon the ECHO data, the ratio of inspection frequency is 1:12.37, 
whereas the aggregate inspection ratio is 1:11.07. Therefore, across all states, Target received 
an inspection for approximately every 11 facilities with the inspections concentrated within the 
store structural element. 
8.2.3 Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, and Texas 
The ECHO data reported a total of 182 facilities for Target for the selected states: 




and one corporate facility. Target experienced 17 inspections over the past five years. The 
frequency of the inspections per facility ranged from one visit to two visits, with a mean of 1.21 
visits. Specifically, 11 facilities were inspected once; and three facilities were inspected twice. 
The high enforcement strategy states, Kentucky and Missouri, conducted 17 inspections and 
the low enforcement strategy states, Arkansas and Texas, conducted zero inspections. 
Table 10 depicts a comparison of ECHO data and firm data pertaining to the number of 
facilities. The comparison of ECHO data depicts less store locations than reported by the firm; 
however, the number of corporate facilities is more than reported by the firm and the reported 
distribution center facilities match. The numbers for stores in the ECHO data confirms reporting 
errors within the ECHO system. The errors could be associated with a lack of updated state 
facility information or the different RCRA facility classification of some of the Target store 
locations. 
 
Table 10. Number of facilities, inspections, and enforcement type by state19. 
State 





 Firm Data 
DC Store RC Corp. DC Store RC Corp. ECHO Data 
Arkansas 0 8 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 Low 
Kentucky 0 4 0 0 0 13 0 0 2 High 
Missouri 1 35 0 1 0 39 0 0 15 High 
Texas 1 132 0 0 2 198 0 0 0 Low 
Total 2 179 0 1 2 258 0 0 17  
Total 182 260   
 
 
Table 11 depicts the incident of inspections by state and structural element for the past 
five years as reported in the ECHO database. Across the states, distribution centers and return 
centers were not inspected; stores were inspected 15 times; and a corporate facility was 
inspected twice. Comparing frequency of inspections across states, stores and corporate 
facilities received repeat inspections. The cross state comparison indicates the store structural 
element of the business system innovation receives the most enforcement events. Based upon 
                                               
19 Information obtained from: (Target Corporation, 2010a; US Environmental Protection Agency, 2010a) 
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 Both the General Merchandise and SuperTarget platforms were included in the ECHO data obtained 




the ECHO data, the aggregate inspection ratio is 1:10.71 for the high enforcement states and 
the aggregate inspection ratio is zero for the low enforcement states due to no inspections. 
Additionally, the high enforcement state inspections were concentrated primarily within the store 
structural element. Therefore, Target received higher frequencies of inspections from the high 
enforcement states which were concentrated within the store structural element. 
A review of Arkansas reveals 8 facilities reported in the ECHO database; however, no 
regulatory activity has occurred over the past five years. A review of Texas reveals 133 facilities 
reported in the ECHO database; however, no regulatory activity has occurred over the past five 
years. Based upon review of the ECHO data, Arkansas and Texas showed no concentration of 
inspections within a specific structural element; however, this could be a misleading assessment 
due to the fact no facilities were inspected. 
A review of Kentucky reveals four facilities classified as the store structural element 
reported in the ECHO database with the inspections occurring at the store structural element. 
Based upon the ECHO data, the ratio of inspection frequency and the aggregate inspection ratio 
are 1:2 for stores. Based upon review of the ECHO data, Kentucky showed a concentration of 
inspections within the store structural element; however, this could be a misleading assessment 
due to no other structural elements located within the state. 
A review of Missouri reveals 37 facilities reported in the ECHO database with the 
majority of inspection occurring at the store structural element with a single inspection of a 
corporate facility. Based upon the ECHO data, the ratio of inspection frequency is 1:1 for 
corporate facilities and 1:3.18 for stores. In comparison, the aggregate inspection ratio is 1:1 for 
corporate facilities and 1:2.33 for stores. Based upon review of the ECHO data, Missouri 
showed a concentration of inspections within the corporate facility element; however, this could 
be a misleading assessment due to the relatively small number of return centers located within 




Table 11. Incident of inspections by state and structural element. 
State Structural element 





to Facility # 
Ratio of 
Aggregate Insp. 
per Facility # 1 2 3 5 
AR Distribution Center -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Store 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Return Center -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Corporate -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Total Aggregate Insp. 0 0 0 0 0   
KY Distribution Center -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Store 2 0 0 0 2 1:2 1:2 
Return Center -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Corporate -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Total Aggregate Insp. 2 0 0 0 2   
MO Distribution Center 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Store 9 2 0 0 11 1:3.18 1:2.33 
Return Center -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Corporate 0 1 0 0 1 1:1 1:1 
Total Aggregate Insp. 9 6 0 0 15   
TX Distribution Center 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Store 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Return Center -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Corporate -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Total Aggregate Insp. 0 0 0 0 0   
 
 
8.3 Comparison Case 
8.3.1 Walmart and Target Nationally 
The ECHO data reported a total of 3,284 facilities for Walmart and a total of 1,484 
facilities for Target with 487 and 134 inspections, respectively, over the past five years. 
Walmart’s ECHO report facilities were 2.21 times Target’s ECHO reported facilities. Additionally, 
Walmart experienced 4.23 times more inspections than Target. Across all US states, Walmart 
experienced an aggregate inspection ratio of 1:6.74, whereas Target experienced an aggregate 
inspection ratio of 1:11.07. Overall across all states, the Big Box business system innovation 
experienced an aggregate inspection ratio of 1:7.68. Therefore, across all states, Walmart was 




8.3.2 Low Enforcement and High Enforcement States 
The high enforcement strategy states, Kentucky and Missouri, conducted 152 inspections and 
the low enforcement strategy states, Arkansas and Texas, conducted 11 inspections. Table 12 
depicts a comparison of ECHO data and firm data pertaining to the number of combined 
facilities for Target and Walmart.  
 
Table 12. Number of facilities, inspections, and enforcement type by state for Walmart 
and Target21. 
State 
Number of Facilities 
Inspections Enforcement 
Type 
ECHO Data Firm Data 
DC Store RC Corp. DC Store RC Corp. ECHO Data 
Arkansas 11 104 3 7 20 88 0 0 3 Low 
Kentucky 2 94 0 0 2 97 0 0 89 High 
Missouri 4 153 0 1 3 158 0 0 63 High 
Texas 14 538 1 1 18 536 0 7 8 Low 
Total 31 889 4 9 43 879 0 7 163  
Total 933 929   
 
 
Table 13 depicts the incident of inspections by state and structural element for the past 
five years as reported in the ECHO database. Based upon the ECHO data, the aggregate 
inspection ratio is 1:1.67 for the high enforcement states and the aggregate inspection ratio is 
1:61.73 for the low enforcement states. Additionally, both the high enforcement and low 
enforcement state inspections were concentrated primarily within the store structural element. 
Therefore, the Big Box business system innovation received higher frequencies of inspections 
from the high enforcement states; however, the inspections were concentrated within the store 
structural element for both high and low enforcement states. 
A review of Arkansas reveals 125 facilities reported in the ECHO database; however, 
minimal regulatory activity has occurred over the past five years with inspection of a single 
return center facility three times. Based upon the ECHO data, the ratio of inspection frequency 
is 1:3, whereas the aggregate inspection ratio is 1:1. Based upon review of the ECHO data, 
                                               
21 Information obtained from: (Target Corporation, 2010a; US Environmental Protection Agency, 2010a; Wal-mart 




Arkansas showed a concentration of inspections within the return center structural element; 
however, this could be a misleading assessment due to the fact a single facility was inspected. 
A review of Kentucky reveals 96 facilities reported in the ECHO database with the 
majority of inspection occurring at the store structural element. Based upon the ECHO data, the 
ratio of inspection frequency is 1:2 for distribution centers and 1:1.77 for stores. In comparison, 
the aggregate inspection ratio is 1:2 for distribution centers and 1:1.15 for stores. Based upon 
review of the ECHO data, Kentucky showed a concentration of inspections within the store 
structural element. 
A review of Missouri reveals 158 facilities reported in the ECHO database with the 
majority of inspections occurring at the store structural element. Based upon the ECHO data, 
the ratio of inspection frequency is 1:4 for distribution centers; 1:2.68 for stores; and 1:1 for 
corporate facilities. In comparison, the aggregate inspection ratio is 1:4 for distribution centers; 
1:2.43 for stores; and 2:1 for corporate facilities. Based upon review of the ECHO data, Missouri 
showed a concentration of inspections within the corporate structural element; however, this 
could be a misleading assessment due to the relatively small number of corporate facilities 
located within the state. 
A review of Texas reveals 554 facilities reported in the ECHO database; however, 
minimal regulatory activity has occurred over the past five years with inspection of four stores 
and a single return center. Based upon the ECHO data, the ratio of inspection frequency is 
1:134.5 for stores and 1:1 for return centers. In comparison, the aggregate inspection ratio is 
1:76.86 for stores and 1:1 for return centers. Based upon review of the ECHO data, Texas 
showed a concentration of inspections within the return center structural element; however, this 
could be a misleading assessment due to the relatively small number of return centers located 





Table 13. Incident of inspections by state and structural element for Walmart and Target. 
State Structural element 





to Facility # 
Ratio of 
Aggregate Insp. 
per Facility # 1 2 3 5 
AR Distribution Center 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Store 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Return Center 0 0 1 0 1 1:3 1:1 
Corporate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Aggregate Insp. 0 0 3 0 0   
KY Distribution Center 1 0 0 0 1 1:2 1:2 
Store 29 15 8 1 53 1:1.77 1:1.15 
Return Center -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Corporate -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Total Aggregate Insp. 30 30 24 5 109   
MO Distribution Center 1 0 0 0 1 1:4 1:4 
Store 54 3 0 0 57 1:2.68 1:2.43 
Return Center -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Corporate 0 1 0 0 1 1:1 2:1 
Total Aggregate Insp. 55 8 0 0 63   
TX Distribution Center 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Store 2 1 1 0 4 1:134.5 1:76.86 
Return Center 1 0 0 0 1 1:1 1:1 
Corporate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Aggregate Insp. 3 2 3 0 0   
 
 
8.4 Cross-Case Comparisons 
8.4.1 Big Box and Structural Elements 
 Based upon the assessment of each firm, Walmart exceeds Target in all the 
independent variables obtained for the study. The Target to Walmart ratio for facilities is 1:1.97 
and annual revenue is 1:6.38 billion.  
 The basis of the Big Box business system innovation is founded on the structural “size” 
of the organization. The independent variables used in this research represent the innovation of 
the organizational structure and the size of the organization structure in terms of contingency 
theory. Overall, the structural systems operated by both firms is the same and consistent with 
the Big Box retail system depicted in Figure 1. However, the prevalence of structural elements 




centers; 1:1.03 for stores; 1:410.5 for return centers; and 1:298.55 for corporate facilities. In 
comparison, Target’s ratios for structural elements are: 1:46.38 for distribution centers; 1:1.03 
for stores; 1:1,484 for return centers; and 1:114.15 for corporate facilities. Both firms, regardless 
of overall size, have the same ratio for stores and a similar ratio for distribution centers. 
However, Walmart has more return centers and Target has more corporate facilities.  
 Based upon this assessment, Walmart’s structural system is consistent with the potential 
RCRA enforcement points identified in Figure 4 resulting in 90% of potential RCRA enforcement 
interactions occurring across three integral structural elements. However, the Target structural 
system would likely experience 85% of potential RCRA enforcement points across two integral 
structural elements, the distribution centers and stores. The low number of return center 
facilities in Target’s structural system reduces the impacts to their organizational structure from 
enforcement of RCRA than experienced by Walmart. 
 Additionally, based upon review of the archival firm data, the overall size of the firms are 
very different. Walmart is unequivocally larger than Target in the number of facilities, store 
platforms, number of products, and revenue. Walmart’s larger organizational system will likely 
be responsible for larger amounts of hazardous wastes generated by the firm, as well as a 
larger geographical presence for the firm.  
Therefore, Walmart should experience more enforcement events (i.e. inspections) and 
incur more external influence impacts from regulatory agencies due to the enforcement of 
RCRA.  
8.4.2 Inspections 
 Based upon assessment of the aggregate inspection ratios, Walmart exceeded Target 
and the combined Big Box business system innovation nationally for inspections; however, the 
combined Big Box Business system exceeded both firms for inspections conducted by the low 
enforcement and high enforcement states. Ranking the states in order of most active to least 




 Consistent with the distributive organizational structure of the Big Box business system 
innovation presented as Figure 4, inspections occur within the different structural elements of 
the organizational system. Looking at the inspection data would indicate a predilection for 
inspections concentrated within the Stores instead of evenly distributed throughout the system 
for all states; however, this assessment is erroneous. Table 14 depicts the aggregate inspection 
ratios by state. Kentucky and Missouri have aggregate inspection ratios indicating inspections 
are performed comparably across the whole system. In comparison, Arizona and Texas has 
aggregate inspection ratios indicating inspections are performed more regularly in the Return 
Centers than Stores. Based upon this assessment, inspections of the Big Box business system 
innovation do not occur distributively throughout the organizational structures by all states. 
 
Table 14. Aggregate inspection ratios by state for cases 
  Structural Element 





0 0 1:1 0 
TX 0 1:58 1:1 0 
KY 
1:5.56 
1:2 1:1.03 -- -- 





-- 0 -- -- 
TX 0 0 -- -- 
KY 
1:10.71 
-- 1:2 -- -- 
MO 0 1:2.33 -- 1:1 




0 0 1:1 0 
TX 0 1:76.86 1:1 0 
KY 
1:1.67 
1:2 1:1.15 -- -- 
MO 1:4 1:2.43 -- 2:1 
 
 
8.4.3 Enforcement Strategies and Regulatory Choke Points 
The type of enforcement strategies used varied between high-enforcement and low-
enforcement states and was consistent across all cases. The low-enforcement states, Arkansas 
and Texas, used a focused enforcement strategy, whereas the high-enforcement states, 




enforcement strategy resulted in the emergence of a chronic regulatory choke point in Kentucky 
for the Walmart case and the comparative case. Missouri’s use of a distributive enforcement 
strategy resulted in minimal regulatory enforcement which did not result in the emergence of a 
regulatory choke point in any of the cases. No acute regulatory choke point was identified. Table 
15 depicts the enforcement strategy and regulatory choke point by cases. 
 
Table 15. Enforcement strategies and regulatory choke point emergence by case 





Orientation of state 
mission/policies  
Walmart 
AR Focused N/A Citizen 
TX Focused N/A Business 
KY Distributive Chronic Business 
MO Distributive N/A Citizen 
Target 
AR N/A  Citizen 
TX N/A  Business 
KY Distributive N/A Business 
MO Distributive N/A Citizen 
Comparative-Big Box business system innovation 
AR Focused N/A Citizen 
TX Focused N/A Business 
KY Distributive Chronic Business 
MO Distributive N/A Citizen 
 
 
Walmart experienced focused and distributive enforcement strategies between the four 
states. Kentucky’s active regulatory enforcement strategies resulted in emergence of a chronic 
regulatory choke point. In comparison, Missouri appears to balance the distributive enforcement 
strategy without causing a regulatory choke point for Walmart. No acute regulatory choke point 
was identified. 
Target experienced distributive enforcement strategies between the four states; 
however, it is important to note that the lack of inspections performed by Arkansas and Texas 
prohibited assessment of their enforcement strategy. Missouri and Kentucky appear to balance 
the distributive enforcement strategy without causing a regulatory choke point for Target. No 




Analysis of the Big Box business system innovation indicates it experienced focused and 
distributive enforcement strategies between the four states. Kentucky’s active regulatory 
enforcement strategies results in emergence of a chronic regulatory choke point. However, 
Missouri appears to balance the distributive enforcement strategy without causing a regulatory 
choke point for the Big Box business system innovation. No acute regulatory choke point was 
identified. 
Review of the state missions and policies depict an interesting divergence amongst the 
states. Kentucky and Texas have collaborative-centered missions and policies; however, 
Kentucky was the most active state in enforcement and Texas the third. In comparison, Missouri 
and Arizona have citizen-centered missions and policies and exhibited the second and least 
active state. Additionally, the orientation of the state mission/policies is not consistent with the 
classification of the states as high and/or low enforcement strategies; the enforcement strategy 
used; and/or the likely emergence of a regulatory choke point due to enforcement events.  
8.5 Hypothesis 
The Big Box business system innovation provided a diverse canvas to study the 
adaptation of regulatory enforcement to business innovations. The focus of this study was to 
develop a theory for the emergence of regulatory choke points from the enforcement of RCRA 
in the Big Box retail system. The purpose of this research was to examine the following 
research question: how has enforcement of RCRA adapted to the Big Box business system 
innovation? The following hypothesis was proposed:  
Distributed structural organizational systems create distributed, but large, 
concentrations of hazardous wastes and universal wastes and, thus, will 
experience distributed environmental enforcement events. 
 
Based upon the analysis of the case studies, distributive enforcement was not 
experienced universally across both firms either individually or cumulatively. Therefore, the 
analysis does not support the hypothesis listed above. However, it is worth noting that the high 




CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION 
 
 
This research provided the first, important insight into the regulatory enforcement of 
RCRA experienced by the Big Box business system innovation. The organizational structure of 
the Big Box business system innovation is a highly complex, distributive system requiring fluidity 
from its structural elements and its interactions with external influences. Due to the unique 
organizational structure and presence of the Big Box business system innovation firms, one 
would expect the Big Box business system innovation would be exposed to regular regulatory 
enforcement events across all states; states would develop different enforcement strategies to 
address the enforcement of RCRA; and the size of a firm, through assessment of their structural 
elements, would be representative of the magnitude of enforcement events. (Earnhart, 2009) 
 The use of contingency theory facilitated the understanding of the interactions occurring 
between the Big Box business system innovation and the selected states in the cases 
conducted herein. Contingency theory allowed the research to determine that the size of the Big 
Box business system innovation does not appear to be directly associated with regulatory 
enforcement events across all states. In contrast, the size of the Big Box business system 
innovation does appear to be associated with the magnitude of inspections experienced by a 
firm. As discovered herein, Walmart consistently receives more regulatory enforcement events 
per structural element than Target. Additionally, the ability to define the Big Box business 
system innovation as a distributive system facilitated the understanding of the different 
regulatory enforcement strategies used by states and the impact to the firm of the enforcement 
strategies.  
9.1 State Implications 
From the state perspective, the variation of enforcement strategies observed between 
states is consistent with the compliance and enforcement policy research. State regulatory 




2004) Overall, EPA and state agencies should be aware of the continuing disparity and 
inconsistencies of regulatory enforcement of firms. This research has identified that the 
enforcement of RCRA has not universally adapted to the demands of the Big Box business 
system innovation. This research provided evidence that organizational structural elements, 
such as number of facility locations, were directly related to the magnitude of RCRA inspections 
over a five year period. (Telle, 2009) Therefore, EPA and state agencies are responding to 
external influences in making enforcement strategy decisions. These external influences will 
increase the likelihood of the emergence of regulatory choke points as a direct result of 
regulatory enforcement.  
Furthermore, these findings suggest the importance of rival, non-controlled variables, 
such as influences by state political priorities and budget constraints as an influencing factor on 
state enforcement strategies. (Atlas, 2007; Helland, 1998; Konisky, 2007) This finding, also, 
suggests the use of informal processes in the selection of firms for enforcement activity, which 
was preliminarily discussed in Section 7.3, but not addressed in this research. 
In order to develop a harmonious regulatory arena, EPA and state agencies should re-
evaluate regulatory enforcement strategies being utilized by EPA and state agencies to prevent 
the development of adversarial interactions revolving around environmental regulatory 
enforcement. 
9.2 Firm Implications 
From the firm perspective, the variation of enforcement strategies observed between 
high-enforcement and low-enforcement states creates a situation where it is difficult to develop 
adaptation strategies. For distributive enforcement strategies, a firm will standardize, formalize, 
and centralize the processes associated with the regulation in question through the 
development of SOPs, Best Management Practices (BMPs), and corporate policies. For a firm 
experiencing a chronic regulatory choke point in association with distributive enforcement, the 




system. The use of the adaptation strategies listed above is not sufficient to relieve the stresses 
the system is experiencing through the magnitude of enforcement events. Furthermore, the 
ability to ensure consistency in the implementation of adaptation strategies, such as SOPs and 
BMPs, decreases. (Schauer & Zeckhauser, 2007; Wu, 2009) 
For focused enforcement strategies, a firm will focus on in-depth training and potentially 
assignment of specialize personnel to address the higher incidence of regulatory enforcement. 
These strategies are used within the standard industrial manufacturing industry. For a firm 
experiencing an acute regulatory choke point in association with focused enforcement, the 
repeated inspection events at targeted facility locations will result in constraints on the 
organizational system. The Big Box business system innovation is further impaired in its 
response capabilities by the magnitude of geographical locations of the system. The higher the 
frequency of focused enforcement events dispersed throughout the US further restricts the 
firm’s ability to adapt. 
The variation in enforcement strategies experienced by the Big Box business system 
innovation presents a challenge for developing a uniform adaptation strategy. Firms will be 
essentially stuck between a rock and a hard place due to the different requirements associated 
with variation of enforcement strategies. The Big Box business system innovation is further 
complicated by the number of geographical locations, because the geographical diversity of the 
distributed system constrains the organizational system’s ability to respond. (Schauer & 
Zeckhauser, 2007; Wu, 2009) 
When a firm begins to experience variation in enforcement strategies, it will attempt to 
create one-off solutions to immediately reduce the congestion of its organizational system. 
However, focusing on adaptation strategies geared towards one enforcement strategy will result 





As the variation continues, the level of congestion will escalate until it causes a 
constraint to appear with the organizational structure. As the number of constraints increases 
and the level of congestion does not abate, the firm will begin to implement organizational-wide 
policies and procedures in an attempt to reduce the level of uncertainty existing within the firm. 
However, the implementation of organizational-wide policies and procedures will result in an 
over-correction to the organizational system, thereby effectively creating firm-imposed 
organizational congestion. The firm will attempt to operate within the confines of organizational 
congestion; however, this strategy is not sustainable long term. It is unclear what the breaking 
point for a firm will be; however, it is speculated that firm adaptation costs would have to be high 
for market-driven firms, such as the Big Box business system innovation, to change the 
structural elements of the organizational system. (Schauer & Zeckhauser, 2007; Wu, 2009) 
9.3 Regulatory Choke Points 
This research attempted to develop a theory revolving around the emergence of 
regulatory choke points occurring from different types of enforcement strategies; however, the 
research failed to provide a fully developed theory. The theory failed to provide a threshold for 
the triggering of a regulatory choke point.  
Due to the small magnitudes of inspections by the low enforcement states using a 
focused enforcement strategy, this research was unable to determine if an acute regulatory 
choke point had emerged. The lack of a threshold affected the ability for the determination of 
emergence of an acute regulatory choke point. However, it is suggested the emergence of an 
acute regulatory choke point would resemble the ratio of inspection frequency and aggregate 
inspection ratios described above for the low enforcement states, but using much larger 
quantities of inspections. 
It is without question that I believe the theory of emerging regulatory choke points is 
valid. This research empirically proved two firms from the same industry experience different 




variations will result in different stresses to identical organizational systems requiring different 
firm adaptation strategies. The regulatory choke point theory is an attempt to provide 
justification and explain the reason firms have to utilize different firm adaptation strategies. 
Further research at the facility level, instead of the firm level, would be required to adequately 
establish a threshold for precipitating the emergence of regulatory choke points. 
9.4 Directions for further research 
The magnitude and impact of environmental regulation and enforcement on Big Box has 
the potential to be extensive and on a scale not seen to date. Furthermore, the extent of 
business and government interactions occurring as a result of the breadth of the Big Box 
business system innovation has far-reaching implications. Areas of analysis that could 
contribute to the research would include the following: 
 Assessment of a state utilizing a dual distributed, focused enforcement strategy resulting 
in the emergence of simultaneous chronic and acute regulatory choke points. Based 
upon the number of environmental lawsuits filed against Big Box business system 
innovation firms and the lack of reported enforcement activity in ECHO, I suggest 
California might be utilizing the dual enforcement strategy. 
 Analysis of the other categories of the Big Box business system innovations, such as the 
category killer retailers like Home Depot and Lowe’s Home Improvement Centers. The 
nature of their business operations could result in the potential to accumulate larger 
quantities of hazardous materials, which would likely result in the use of different 
enforcement strategies by states. 
 Classification of regulatory choke points in terms of the business costs to facilitate an 
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